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ABSTRACT

This study examined attitudes among faculty of Florida State University (FSU) toward an established merit pay system and in particular whether faculty were more comfortable with a merit system which included departmentally developed criteria. Union and administration had agreed on a merit pay system in 1984 which included faculty and departmental participation in developing the system. The data for this study came from a questionnaire survey of the faculty and librarians at each of the nine institutions in the FSU system. Analysis of the 954 usable questionnaires returned (a 16.5 percent response rate) found lower support for merit pay among more senior ranked faculty, among those in small comprehensive universities, among union members, among librarians, and among faculty in the humanities, arts and letters, and education. Stronger relationships were found for variables representing experiences in the department with merit pay. In particular faculty attitudes were related to whether they were aware of departmental merit criteria, whether they believed raises had been distributed according to those criteria, and whether they believed their department had received a fair share of university merit pay funds. (Contains 18 references.) (JB)



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Faculty Support for a Merit Pay System

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Faculty Support for a Merit Pay System Abstract

This study examines faculty attitudes toward an established merit pay system. Literature on predictors of attitudes is reviewed. The study, done using a sample of faculty in a large state university system, finds lower support for merit pay among more senior ranked faculty, those in small comprehensive universities, union members, librarians and faculty in the humanities, arts, and letters, and education. Stronger relationships are found for variables representing experiences in the department with merit pay — whether faculty are aware of departmental merit criteria, whether they believe raises have been distributed according to those criteria, and whether their department has received a fair share of university merit pay funds.



Faculty Support for a Merit Pay System Introduction

Fiscal crises in many states have led to renewed concern about allocation of resources in public universities and colleges. One reaction to a shortage of funds for faculty salaries has been a call for merit-based reward systems rather than across-the-board raises. In some states, this has been combined with legislative calls for "accountability", and for rewards for teaching rather than research, leading to interest in merit systems as incentives for greater productivity or shifts in the predominant area of productivity.

As external forces press institutions toward increased reliance on "merit" as a criterion for salary increases, it becomes more important to understand the consequences of such systems for faculty morale, retention, and productivity. If "merit pay" is to genuinely encourage faculty effort in one or more areas of emphasis, then it becomes essential that faculty perceive the system as clear, legitimate, and just. Without these perceptions, a reward system among professional employees is unlikely to be effective in motivating effort in one or more areas of responsibility.

This study reviews relevant literature on salary distributions and satisfaction with salary, examines a limited set of hypotheses concerning the determinants of faculty attitudes toward merit pay, presents some exploratory analyses, and suggests needed areas for future investigation.

Literature Review

Little information exists on the current prevalence of merit pay systems in academe. NCPGF (1990) conducted a survey of institutions and found that 59% claimed to have merit pay plans. Merit pay was more likely in public than independent colleges, and research universities and doctoral institutions than others. The average size and distribution of merit increases was 2-4%, with two-thirds of faculty receiving some level of merit pay. They found that faculty generally played only an advisory role, or had no role in setting salaries in their department. In addition, in most institutions, faculty received little information on the distribution of salary increases, including those related to merit.

Analyses of determinants of faculty salaries are another source of information on the extent of rewards for "merit" in faculty compensation. Because of the widespread interest in race and sex discrimination in faculty salaries, multiple regression analyses of the determinants of salary abound. However, few data sets have contained more than incidental measures of "merit." The most common variable included has been some measure of research productivity -- usually a simple measure of number of publications or citations to publications. From such analyses, we can make the general statement that salary and other rewards tend to be given for research rather than teaching or service (Tuckman, Capinski, and Hageman, 1976; Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990). Research universities more commonly reward research productivity and credentials and actually penalize hours of teaching, while comprehensive colleges tend to reward longevity of service and penalize teaching less (Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990). Some work also indicates that both research and administration carry greater returns in salary than teaching and service (Tuckman et al, 1977).



Overall, productivity and evaluation measures add little to prediction of salary independent of measures of rank (Lassiter, 1983). But pay is affected by productivity more in departments emphasizing research, with collective bargaining agreements, in academic fields with more highly developed scientific paradigms, and characterized by research collaboration (Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990; Fox, 1985).

We also know that <u>dispersion</u> in salaries is greater in private universities, larger departments, with less social contact among department members, less democratic and participative governance, and greater homogeneity (Pfeffer and Langton, 1988).

Increasingly, "market" forces determine faculty salaries, with differences between disciplines more significant than in the past. And, while rank differentials seem to have decreased with the growth of salary "compression" due to market changes, rank is historically one of the best predictors of salaries (Lassiter, 1983). These patterns appear likely to lead to contrasting interests in across-the-board vs. merit raises. Since merit funds tend to be provided to departments based upon a proportion of base salaries, those in higher paid disciplines stand to get greater merit rewards (in dollar amounts) than those in lower paid disciplines. Thus one would expect that those in higher paid disciplines would perceive greater equity in distribution of merit raises, and would show greater support for future merit pay. Since some across-the-board raise can also generally be taken for granted, faculty in business, engineering, and the natural sciences (with higher average pay) stand to gain by a combination of across-the-board and merit pay. On the other hand, individual faculty in higher ranks (with higher average salaries) are not guaranteed a proportional share of merit funds. funds allocated to their departments might in fact be more likely to be



provided to younger faculty who tend to be more productive in research. Thus full and associate professors should be less supportive of merit pay.

There is literature that suggests that when wage dispersion becomes greater than acceptable under the normative system of an organization, that unionization is more likely (Pfeffer and Langton, 1988.) Correspondingly, those who join unions may be those who perceive wage dispersion in their organization as outside the normative bounds.

Finally, literature on satisfaction with wages and dispersion in wages suggests the importance of several interpersonal factors. Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1992) have found that openness (e.g. in public rather than private employment contexts) increases the availability of comparative information and so generates dissatisfaction. This suggests, however, that openness generates dissatisfaction because what is revealed is considered unfair dispersion in salaries.

Legal standards for merit-rating systems suggest that an appraisal process be formalized, standardized and as objective as possible (Fox, 1981). Licata (1986), in a review of post-tenure evaluation plans, suggests that successful plans must involve faculty involvement in the design of the plan, and agreement between administrators and faculty on the specifics of the plan. Salomone and Vorhies (1985) describe a merit pay system which they believe has been supported by faculty, and identify crucial factors in its success as its objectivity and its being faculty-administered. These findings and legal standards suggest the importance of persuasive justifications of wage inequalities (Soltan, 1987). In most organizational settings, Soltan suggests that "importance" and "difficulty" of jobs are central as persuasive justifications of inequalities. In the case of merit pay -- a cause of inequality or dispersion in salaries -- persuasive justification should be



built around disciplinary and/or organizational normative systems. Where faculty believe that merit pay has been allocated according to accepted disciplinary or organizational standards for "productivity," they should be more likely to accept merit pay. For faculty, departmental norms seem to be more influential and legitimate than those of the broader organization. Thus where faculty perceive that departmentally developed criteria for merit exist, are followed, and are accompanied by sufficient allocation of funds, then they should be more likely to accept merit pay.

Hypothesis 1: From this, one would expect that merit pay would be more accepted in larger and research-oriented universities, and least accepted in teaching-oriented institutions.

Hypothesis 2: One would expect that merit pay would be more accepted in fields in which there is greater consensus about what constitutes quality and quantity of productivity -- math. sciences, engineering and business -- the same disciplines with higher average salaries and so greater merit rewards. In social sciences and the humanities, more conflict is evident over what constitute "high quality" journals, over the place of applied vs. pure research, and over interdisciplinary, feminist, and critical theory approaches vs. mainstream work.

Hypothesis 3: Faculty in higher ranks will be less supportive of merit pay and more supportive of acress-the-board raises.

Hypothesis 4: Union members will be less supportive of merit pay.

Hypothesis 5: Where faculty believe that there are departmentally-based merit criteria, where they believe that those criteria are followed, and where they believe that the administration provides sufficient funding for merit rewards, there will be greater support for merit pay.



This study examines faculty support for merit pay in a state university system. Exploratory analyses are presented that allow for the assessment of variations between and within institutions. Since this is secondary analysis of a survey designed for other purposes, variables in the data set are limited. In addition, the response rate was low, and the sample cannot be said to be fully representative of the population. However, it has compensating advantages as a source of information.

The data come from a sample of faculty and professional employees in the Florida State University System in 1988. This system constitutes a useful context for analysis of attitudes toward merit pay. In 1984, negotiations between the union representing faculty and the system's Board of Regents resulted in a merit pay system. This followed years of negotiations in which the Board of Regents had insisted on its need for discretionary raises to reward merit. The union had insisted that faculty should know the criteria for such merit raises, and should have input into their development. The Agreement reached specified that faculty in each department, unit would be able to draft proposed merit pay criteria, for review and approval by the administration of each university.

The collective bargaining agreement language specified that "(T)he employees of each academic department or equivalent academic unit, and of administrative units within the library, shall develop and recommend written criteria and related evaluative procedures to be used by each university for the distribution of salary increase funds which the Board shall make available for the purpose of rewarding meritorious performance." (BCR/UFF Collective Bargaining Agreement, 1985-88). Employees were first to vote on the process for developing or revising the merit criteria and evaluative procedures. Administrators were to discuss the procedures and the mission and goals of the



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university and department with the employees. Then, by secret ballot vote of at least a majority of employees in the department/unit, each department was to recommend the criteria and evaluative procedures.

These criteria were to be written standards of performance and became the sole basis upon which administrators would award merit increases.

Administrators could reject criteria only if they did not comply with relevant laws or rules, were inconsistent with the mission or goals, or did not take into account variation in assigned duties. In these cases, criteria were referred back to the faculty for revision.

The Board of Regents, in contract negotiations, has been adamant that merit raises not be "grievable" under the collective bargaining agreement. Thus an employee who feels that raises were not provided according to the criteria has only a simple "complaint" process available, rather than a formal grievance procedure providing access to required information, and resulting in binding arbitration of remaining disputes. In addition, merit ratings are considered evaluative information, protected from Florida's Public Records law. Thus it has not been possible for the union to monitor the merit ratings vs. the merit raises of employees. Therefore, the non-grievability of merit raises has been a point of contention with the faculty and their union, since this means that administrator compliance with the merit criteria cannot be monitored, nor can individual employees effectively complain when the criteria are not followed in allocating raises.

Inspection of merit criteria at one institution showed that departmental criteria varied significantly in complexity as well as in criteria. Some consist of simple statements of the areas to be evaluated (teaching, research, service) and give evaluative authority to the department chair. Others involve complex weighted point systems for undergraduate teaching evaluations.



number of advisees, quality of journal in which one publishes, number of citations to work appearing that year, and number and type of committees on which one served.

From 1985 to 1988, the state legislature funded merit salary increases in addition to across-the-board and discretionary increases. Since 1988, due to limited state resources and Board of Regents priorities, no funds for merit pay have been mandated by the SUS or the legislature, though some departments have elected to provide discretionary increases according to merit criteria. Therefore, since 1988, one would expect that knowledge of, and interest in, departmental merit criteria has declined, and therefore the 1988 data may be our best information on attitudes and predictors, despite their limitations.

Methods

In the Fall of 1988, a questionnaire was distributed to faculty and librarians at each of the nine institutions of the Florida State University System (FSUS). The questionnaire was designed as part of a faculty union assessment of faculty attitudes on bargaining priorities on salary issues. The questionnaires were distributed to campus mail addresses at the nine campuses, either via the campus mail system or by hand distribution to individual mail boxes. All responses were then coded and put into machine readable form. At one university, surveys were hand-tabulated and not available in machine readable form. Therefore this university is not included in the analysis.

A total of 954 usable questionnaires were returned, out of an estimated population of 5777 faculty, for a response rate of only 16.5%. Despite the response rate, comparison to population data (taken from the SUS Authorized Position File) shows that the sample is reasonably comparable to the population in distributions by rank, discipline, and institution.



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Underrepresentation occurs for those at the assistant professor and instructor ranks, faculty in the sciences, math and engineering, and faculty at the older research universities (UF, FSU). Union members, as one would expect, are overrepresented in the sample, with about 45% of the sample claiming union membership, vs. a population figure at that time of about 30% across the system. Some of this may reflect confusion about whether respondents were being asked if they were members of the union, or about whether they were in the union bargaining unit.

Table 1 About Here

Measures. Faculty support for merit pay was assessed by a question asking respondents to indicate whether the proportion of the pay package allocated to merit should be increased, decreased, or remain the same, compared to the previous year. In 1987-88, an average raise of 6.5% of base salary was allocated as 2.65% across-the-board, .12% for minimum salaries by rank, 2.53% discretionary, and 1.20% for merit. Faculty were asked whether they would MOST like to see:

- 1. lower merit, higher across-the-board raises
- 2. lower merit, higher discretionary raises
- 3. lower merit, higher across-the-board and discretionary
- 4. higher merit, lower across-the-board raises
- 5. higher merit, lower discretionary raises
- 6. higher merit, lower across-the-board and discretionary
- 7. about the same proportions as last year
- 9. don't know

Faculty perceptions of the fairness of the merit system in their own department and university were assessed with two questions. First, they were asked to indicate their response on this statement "Merit raise funds at my University are fairly distributed to departments." Responses were: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, don't know. Second, they were



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asked to indicate the proportion of the time that merit raises in their department/unit were actually distributed according to the departmental merit criteria: 100%, 75%, 50%, 25%, 0%, or don't know.

Faculty knowledge of departmental merit criteria was assessed with a simple question asking whether their department/unit had approved merit salary increase criteria (yes/no/don't know).

Institutional type. Institutions were classified into three categories. The University of Florida, Florida State University, and the University of South Florida were combined into a category of research university. All were classified in 1987 as either research universities or doctorate-granting I in the Carnegie system (Carnegie Foundation, 1987) and had student enrollments of over 20,000. Florida Atlantic University, Florida International University, and University of Central Florida were rated in 1987 as either Doctorategranting II or Comprehensive I, and had student enrollments ranging from approximately 10,000 to 15,000. These are classified as larger regional universities for the analyses. The remaining category includes the University of North Florida and the University of West Florida. Both averaged about 5,700 students in 1987, and were rated as Comprehensive Colleges I in the Carnegie system. They are labeled as smaller regional universities for these analyses. Combining the universities into these categories not only allows the examination of hypotheses about size and research emphasis, but provides a sufficient number of cases for analysis of the smaller institutions.

<u>Field/discipline</u>. Faculty were grouped into broad discipline categories to facilitate analysis. The categories are: (1) social and behavioral sciences, (2) education, health and human services (including education faculty assigned to the Developmental Research Schools (lab schools), (3)



humanities, arts, and letters, (4) math, natural sciences and engineering, (5) business and public administration. A sixth category includes those in professional positions in the libraries. Numbers in other categories (e.g., counselors) were too small for analysis and were omitted from analyses.

Rank. All faculty, librarians, and lab school instructors are classified by rank: full, associate, assistant, or instructor/lecturer.

Counselors, research associates and others without faculty rank appear as A&P (administrative and professional).

Union membership. This is taken from self-report on the questionnaire. Florida is a right-to-work state, in which employees cannot be compelled to join or pay agency fees to a union, but must be represented by the union without discrimination based on membership or non-membership.

Results

Perceptions of Merit Pav System

Table 2 shows the distribution of response on the indicators of knowledge about, and perceptions of, the merit pay system in the SUS.

Table 2 About Here

While all units were required to have merit criteria, only 69% of faculty stated that their department had such criteria. In fact, since merit pay could not legally be given out without such criteria, virtually all units did have criteria. The only cases in which units have not had such criteria has been small units of professional employees (a few counselors in a student affairs office, for example). Eleven percent of respondents were sure that their units did not have criteria, and almost 20% did not know. Thus, despite the fact that only four years had past since an extensive effort at criteria



development, and despite the fact that raises had been provided, many faculty were not informed about the process.

The lack of information was more apparent when faculty were asked whether their department had received a fair share of merit pay funds. In some departments, this had been a point of severe conflict. Within colleges, some faculty felt that each department should receive a share of merit funds proportional to the faculty salary base for the department. Others felt that some departments had more meritorious faculty than others and should receive a greater share of the merit funds. The combination of lack of information and conflict can clearly be seen in results. Only 18% agree that their department received a fair share of funds, while over 35% disagreed, and 46% did not know.

Over a third of faculty also felt they did not have enough information to know whether merit criteria in their own department actually determined allocation of merit funds. While 22% said that raises were always given out according to criteria, about the same proportion thought that the criteria were used 25% or less of the time.

Support for Merit Pav System

About 47% of respondents felt that the proportion of the raise package allocated for merit should be lower than that for 1987-88 (i.e., 1.2% out of 6.5% or about 20% of the raise). Only one percent of faculty wanted discretionary raises rather than merit raises. Most wanted a higher across-the-board raise rather than merit. Correspondingly, only about 10% of faculty wanted to shift funds from across-the-board raises to merit raises. More wanted to move from discretionary to merit raises (18%). About 15% felt that the prior year's proportions had been about right.

Correlates of Support for Merit Pay



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While limited by the categories of responses, the best indicator of support for merit pay is support for higher merit pay -- whether the respondent feels that should come at the expense of a lower across-the-board raise, lower discretionary raise, or both. To an extent, support for the current ratios also indicates support, since almost one-fifth of the pay package was for merit. Opposition to merit pay can be seen in the three categories for lower merit raise preferences, either for across-the-board, discretionary, or both.

<u>Institutional Variation</u>

Table 3 shows that both research and larger regional universities have higher proportions of faculty reporting that their departments do have approved merit criteria. Almost 20% of those in the two smaller universities say that they are sure their departments do not have such criteria.

Similarly, more faculty at the small universities disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that merit funds are fairly distributed to departments.

This pattern can also be seen in responses on whether merit is distributed by the approved criteria. Creater proportions of faculty at research and large regional universities say that merit has been distributed according to the criteria at least 75% of the time. Note also that it is in the research universities that the smallest proportion of faculty say they don't know if raises are distributed according to criteria (35.1%).

Finally, this table shows that there is little variation in support for merit pay by institutional type. The only clear pattern is the greater proportion of those in the small universities that want lower merit in exchange for either higher across-the-board or higher discretionary and across-the-board. On the other hand, in both the research universities and



larger regional comprehensive universities, there is greater support for higher merit raises, especially in exchange for lower discretionary raises.

Table 3 About Here

Overall, despite the above patterns, there are only minor institutional variations in perceptions of the merit system and support for it. Only the relationship between institutional type and perception that raises are distributed by departmental criteria reaches statistical significance.

Variation by Field

There are significant variations in perceptions of the merit pay system by field/unit. Those in the university libraries are most likely to be aware that their unit has approved merit criteria. Those in the social and behavioral sciences, education, and the liberal arts also have over 70% of respondents reporting that they know their unit has criteria. Those in math, the sciences, and business show smaller proportions aware of the existence of criteria.

Table 4 About Here

Despite their lack of knowledge of the criteria, more of those in math, science, and business believe that raises are given out fairly to their department. This may reflect the fact that most of the universities provided a share of funds based upon a unit's salary rate. Thus "merit" paid off in larger dollar awards in the higher paid disciplines than in the lower-paid humanities, education, social sciences and library units.

This table also indicates that variations in perceptions of use of criteria in allocations within departments varies by field, but not with the relatively clear pattern found for the above two variables. Those in the libraries and education are least likely to believe that raises are provided according to criteria at least 75% of the time. Those in the social sciences and



humanities are more likely to believe criteria are used, and to least likely to say that they don't know enough to say.

Faculty in social science, math, natural science, and business are least likely to want reductions in merit pay. Librarians, and faculty in education and the humanities are least supportive of merit pay.

Variations by Rank

Significantly more full and associate professors are aware of the existence of departmental criteria. Assistant professors and instructors are most likely to be unsure, while almost a third of those in professional positions are sure they don't have criteria.

Table 5 About Here

Similarly, higher proportions of assistant professors, instructors and professional employees are unsure whether their unit gets an equitable share of merit pay funds. Full and associate professors are more likely to be aware of the funding system and to support it. However, this support is limited -- less than 1/4 of all higher ranked faculty agree that funds are equitably distributed to departments.

Comparable patterns are found for awareness of whether funds are distributed according to criteria within departments. Full and associate professors are less likely to say they don't know whether criteria are followed, and more likely to believe that criteria are followed at least 75% of the time. However, full and associate professors are also more likely to say that criteria are not followed, reflecting the much smaller proportions in the "don't know" category.

Despite this pattern, assistant professors are less likely to support reductions in merit pay and increases in across-the-board raises, compared to



full and associate professors. Out of the assistant professors, 21.4% would like the same ratio as for the prior year, while 40.4% would like greater proportions for merit. Only 27.8% want more in across-the-board raises and less in merit. Out of full professors, over 40% want more in across-the-board and less in merit, 15% want the same proportion as the prior year, and 38% want more for merit.

Variations by Union Membership

Finally, we turn to an analysis of the correlation between union membership and perceptions of the merit pay system in the FSUS. Table 6 shows that significantly more union members are aware of the existence of approved merit criteria in their unit, with a smaller proportion saying they don't know.

Table 6 About Here

Despite this, members and nonmembers are equally unsure about whether their own department gets a fair share of merit funds (45% for members, 48% for nonmembers). Among those with an opinion, union members are somewhat more likely to believe their unit is not fairly treated (21% strongly disagreeing vs. 15% for nonmembers.)

A very similar pattern is seen for perceptions that raises are distributed according to merit criteria. Union members and nonmembers are equally likely to say that they don't know, while members are slightly less likely to say that raises are given according to criteria at least 75% of the time. However this relationship does not reach statistical significance.

Finally, in this table, one can see that union members differ from nonmembers primarily in their lesser support for merit pay at the expense of a reasonable cost of living raise for all employees. However, members are also



slightly more likely than nonmembers to support higher merit raises in return for the reduction of discretionary raises.

Perceptions of Merit Pay System and Support for Merit Pay

In the remaining tables, one can examine the relationship between knowledge of the merit pay system, the perception that the merit pay system is followed, and support for additional merit pay. In Table 7, those faculty who say that their unit does not have criteria are least likely to support additional funds for merit pay, and most likely to support and across-the-board raise. However, because this is the only substantial difference, the relationship overall does not reach statistical significance.

Table 7 About Here

Table 8 shows that perceptions of equity in distribution of merit pay funds to departments significantly increases support for merit pay, compared to either across-the-board or discretionary raises. Among the small proportion of the sample that strongly agrees or agrees that their departments get a fair share, most are either satisfied with the current ratios or would support additional funds for merit. Among those who believe their department does not get sufficient funding, more than half would support cuts in merit pay.

Table 8 About Here

This pattern is also clearly seen in Table 9. Among those who perceive that raises are given according to the criteria within their department, few support reductions in merit pay. Among those where criteria are not followed, faculty believe that merit should be reduced. Note however, that almost no faculty, regardless of perceptions, would prefer discretionary raises to merit



raises. The primary alternative seen is to increase the across-the-board component.

Table 9 About Here

Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research

Several suggestions for improvement in merit pay systems can be made on the basis of these findings. First, merit systems face particular hurdles in smaller teaching-oriented institutions. This may reflect the lower consensus on what constitutes productivity in teaching or service, lower reliability of ratings of those areas, and consequent disagreements over which faculty are "meritorious." This is accentuated by the greater social contact and homogeneity, which discourage dispersion in salaries. Thus faculty participation in the design of the system becomes critical, as does continued revision and distribution of criteria to faculty. Without this, new faculty are unaware of the criteria and have had no input into them, and the criteria may no longer reflect faculty consensus. Similarly, the distrust of merit pay in certain fields means that criteria may not recognize multiple definitions of "merit" in those fields, or the greater variations in assignments to teaching, public service, and research. Even the lesser interest in merit pay on the part of more senior faculty may reflect the fact that they have shifted to concentration on teaching and service rather than research, or to longer research projects resulting in books over a period of years rather than an article a year. In either case, annual merit increases based primarily on annual research productivity may be failing to reward other equally valid forms of productivity. Finally, the critical variables in understanding support for merit pay appear to be perceptions of the merit criteria themselves. Where faculty are aware of the criteria, feel they are used by



department chairs/Deans in allocation of rewards, and feel that the central administration provides equitable allocations for merit to departments, they are more likely to support merit pay. This implies that frequent distribution and discussion of criteria, revision on a periodic basis, openness about policies on funding of awards, and change in allocations to departments can improve support for merit pay systems. A crucial factor also appears to be the provision of an adequate cost-of-living increase. Many faculty support across-the-board as an alternative to merit increases, in part reflecting the fact that across-the-board raises in the FSUS have traditionally been less than the increase in the cost of living. Merit is accepted as an alternative to discretionary increases. Faculty prefer that raises be given out according to known, disseminated, faculty-developed criteria.

Several directions for future research are suggested. First, we need to know more about the perceptions of merit pay among different demographic groupings -- especially by gender, ethnic group, and age. Along with this, we need data that allow the greater examination of explanations of the effects of these demographic variables and field, rank, union membership, and institutional type. This requires information on the nature of the merit criteria, their development, and the history and policies for funding of merit and other increases. In addition, better measures of perceptions of equity and fairness in following criteria are needed. What are the standards by which faculty judge whether criteria are fair, or are followed, or are adequately funded?



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	Sample	APF
Rank		
Full prof	39.0%	33.0%
Associate	39.2	27.6
Assistant	15.3	18.4
Instructor	3.7	4.5
Other	2.4	16.5*
No answer	N=6 4	
	(6.7%)	
Field		
Social-Behavioral	14.4%	13.1%
Education/Human Serv.	22.3	16.1
Humanities, Letters,		
Arts	24.9	20.1
Math/Sciences/Engr.	17.1	26.7
Business/Public Adm	13.4	12.5
Other (library,		
counselors,etc.)	8.0	13.2
No answer	N=93	
	(9.7%)	
Institution (omitting Flo	rida A&M Univers	<u>ity)</u>
Florida Atlantic	10.6%	8.2%
Florida Intl	10.5	6.7
Florida State	15.4	21.6
U Central Fl	10.9	10.0
U Florida	22.6	26.6
U North Fl	4.2	3.7
U South Fl	21.8	19.3
U West Fi	4.0	4.1

^{*} The APF rank variable does not include the ranked librarians and lab school instructors in the rank categories, but treats as "other."



TABLE 2
PERCEPTIONS AND SUPPORT FOR MERIT PAY

DEPARTMENT	PAH	MERIT	CP ITERIA

NO-ANSWER

DEPARIMENT HAS MERTI CRI	IERIA				
				Valid	Cum
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Percent	Percent
YES	1	647	67.S	68.8	68.8
0'!	2	107	11.2	11.4	30.2
DK	9	186	19.5	19.8	100.0
NO-ANSWER	0	14	1.5	MISSING	
	TOTAL	954	100.0	100.0	
DEPARTMENT RECEIVES FAIR	SHARE OF	MERIT FUNDS			
				Valid	Cum
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Percent	Percent
STRONGLY-AGREE	1	40	4.2	4.3	4.3
ACREE	2	128	13.4	13.7	18.0
DISACREE	3	167	17. <i>5</i>	17.9	35.S
STRONGLY-DISAGREE	4	166	17.4	17.S	<i>5</i> 3.6
DK	9	434	45.5	46.4	100.0

DEPT. MERIT FUNDS DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO CRITERIA

TOTAL

				Valid	Cum
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Percent	Percent
100% OF THE TIME	1	203	21.3	22.0	22.0
7 <i>5</i> %	2	160	16.8	17.3	39.3
50%	3	83	8.7	9.0	48.3
25%	4	71	7.4	7.7	56.0
0% OF THE TIME	5	60	6.3	6.5	62.4
DK	9	347	36.4	37.6	100.0
NO-ANSWER	0	30	3.1	MISSING	
	TOTAL	954	100.0	100.0	

19

954 100.0

2.0 MISSING

100.0

PROPORTION OF FUNDS FOR MERIT,	ACROSS-THE-BOARD, AND	DISCRETIONARY	RAISES
PROPOR	•	Valid	

PROPOR				valid	Cum
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Percent	Percent
LOWER MERIT-HIGHER ATB	1	347	36.4	38.3	38.3
LOWER MERIT-HIGHER DISCRET	2	13	1.4	1.4	39.7
LOWER MERIT-HIGHER BOTH	3	66	6.9	7.3	47.0
HIGHER MERIT-LOWER ATB	4	94	9.9	10.4	57.4
HIGHER MERIT-LOWER DISCRET	5	166	17.4	18.3	75.7
HIGHER MERIT-LOWER BOTH	6	77	8.1	8.5	84.2
ABOUT SAME AS 87-88	7	143	15.0	15.8	100.0
NO-ANSWER	0	48	5.0	MISSING	
	TOTAL	954	100.0	100.0	



TABLE 3
VARIATION BY INSTITUTIONAL TYPE

HAVE	CRITERIA	RY	INSTIT	ITTONAL.	TYPE

17100 IT	Count Col Pct	REG	¦RES	SML	Row Total	
HVCRIT YES	1	203	398	•	647	Chi-square=8.34777 D.F.= 4
NO	2	39	53		107	Significance=.0796
DK	9	59 19.6	111	16	186 19.8	
	Column Total	301 32.0	562 59.8		940 100.0	

DEPARTMENT CETS FAIR SHARE OF MERIT FUNDS BY UNIVERSITY

	Count				Row	
	Col Pct	REG	RES	SML	Total	
DPMERIT	1	12	22	+- - ! 6	+ ! 40	Chi-square=10.29549
STRONCL	Y-ACREE	4.0	3.9	7.7		D.F.= 8 Signficance=.2449
ACREE	2	51	70 12.5	9.0	128	Digilitodiloc 12449
DISAGRE	3 E	49 16.4	108	10 12.8	† 167 17.9	
STRONGL	4 Y-DISACRE	; 50 ; 16.8	98	18	166	
DK	9	136	261 46.7	37 47.4	434 46.4	
	Column Total	298 31.9	559 59.8	78 8.3	935 100.0	



MERIT DISTR			BY UNIVE	ERSITY	D	
	Count Col Pct		RES !	SMIL	Row Total	
DISMER 100%	1	76 25.7	113		22.0	Chi-square=23.74859 D.F.= 10
7 <i>5</i> %	2	40 13.5	112	8	160	Significance=.0083
50%	3	17 5.7	55 9.9	11	83	
25%	4	16 5.4	48 8.7	9.3	71	
0%	5	23	31 5.6	8.0	6.5	
DK	9	124	194 35.1	29	347	
	Column Total	296 32.0	553 59.8	75 8.1	924 100.0	
RAISE PROPO			TTY		l Dom	
RAISE PROPO UNIV->		ł ł	RES	SML	Row Total	
	Count Col Pct	 REG +		SML 28 37.3	Total 347	Chi-square=14.03285
UNIV->	Count Col Pct 1	 REG +	RES + 208	+ 28	Total 347 38.3	D.F.=12 Significance=.2986
UNIV->	Count Col Pct 1 3 2	 REG 111 37.9 	RES 	+ 28	Total 347 38.3 131.4 166	D.F.=12 Significance=.2986
UNIV-> LMER-HATE LM-HDISCE	Count Col Pct 1 3 2	REG 	RES 208 38.7 1.5 1.5	28 37.3	Total 347 38.3 131.4 166	D.F.=12 Significance=.2986
UNIV-> LMER-HATE LM-HDISCE LM HBOTH	Count Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4	REG 111 37.9 5 1.7 1.7 5.8 26	RES 208 38.7 8 1.5 37 6.9	28 37.3 	Total 347 38.3 13 1.4 66 7.3	D.F.=12 Significance=.2986
LMER-HATE LM-HDISCE LM HBOTH HM-LATB	Count Col Pct	REG 	RES 	28 37.3 	Total 347 38.3 13 1.4 66 7.3 10.4 110.4	D.F.=12 Significance=.2986
UNIV-> LMER-HATE LM-HDISCE LM HBOTH HM-LATB HM-LDISCE	Count Col Pct	REG 	RES 208 38.7 1.5 37 6.9 11.3 198 18.2	28 37.3 12 16.0 7 9.3 10 13.3	Total 347 38.3 13 1.4 66 7.3 10.4 166 18.3	D.F.=12 Significance=.2986



TABLE 4 VARIATIONS BY FIELD

DEPARTMENT HAS MERIT CRITERIA BY FIELD

	Count	SOC-BEHA	EDUC :	HUMS-ART	MATH-SCI	BUS-PUB-	LIBRARY	
CENFIELD->	Col Pct	¦ V	! !	S		ADM	! ! !	Row
		1.00	2.00	4.00	6.00	7.00	8.00	Total
HVCRIT		+	÷	+	÷	+	÷	
	1	1 93	137	1 <i>5</i> 0	¦ 8 0 :	† 72	61	<i>5</i> 93
YES		75.6	72.1	71.4	55.9	62.6	88.4	69.8
	_	+	+		+	+	÷+	
110	2	16	18	21	18	17	4 1	94
NO		13.0	9.5	10.0	12.6	14.8	5.8	11.1
	9	14	+ ¦ 35	! 39	+ ! 45	} 26	! 4 !	163
DK	9	11.4	18.4	18.6	31.5	22.6	5.8	19.2
12K		† 11. 4	, 10.4 +	t 10.0	1 21.2 +	. ZZ.O	. J.O .	19.4
	Column	123	190	210	143	115	69	350
	Total	14.5	22.4	24.7	16.8	13.5	8.1	100.0

Chi-Square=35.97775 D.F.=10 Significance=.0001

DEPARTMENT GETS FAIR SHARE OF MERIT FUNDS BY FIELD

Count	SOC-BEHA	EDUC :	HUMS-ART!	MATH-SCI;	BUS-PUB-	LIBRARY	
GENFIELD-> Col Pct	V		S		ADM		Row
	1.00	2.00	4.00	6.00	7.00	8.00	Total
DPMERIT	+	+ 	++		+- -	÷+	•
1	4	5	9 }	7	9	3	37
STRONGLY-AGREE	3.3	2.6	4.3	4.9	8.0	4.3	4.4
_	+	·	+		·	++ ·	
2	13	24	23	26	24	7	117
ACREE	10.7	12.7	11.0	18.2	21.2	10.1	13.8
3	1 32	+ -	+	22	16	; 10 ;	148
DISACREE	26.2	13.8	20.0	15.4	14.2	14.5	17.5
DISAGREE	1 20.2	12.0	. 20.0 j	12.4	14.2 	, 14. <i>)</i> (+	. 17.5
4	19	- 41	49	16	19	! 12 !	1 <i>5</i> 6
STRONGLY-DISACRE	15.6	21.7	23.3	11.2	16.8	17.4	18.4
	+	+	+	+	+	+	•
9	54	93	87	72	45	37	388
DK	44.3	49.2	41.4	<i>5</i> 0.3	39.8	53.6	45.9
	+	+	+	+- -	+	+	-
Column	122	18 9	210	143	113	69	846
Total	14.4	22.3	24.8	16.9	13.4	8.2	100.0

Chi-Square=36.01099 D.F.=.0153 Significance=3.018



MERIT DISTR								
							LIBRARY :	
CENFIELD->	Col Pct		2.00	S 4.00	6.00		S.00	Row Total
DISMER 100%	1	30 25.2	39 20.6	52 25.1	28 19.6	26 23.4	10	185 22.1
7 <i>5</i> %	2	30	22	42 20.3	28	17	12 17.6	151 18.0
50%	3	17	15	25	9 6.3	8 7.2	5.9	78 9.3
2 <i>5</i> %	4	5.0	17	15	1C 17.0	10	7 10.3	65 7.8
0%	5	1 4 1 3.4	16 8.5	11 5.3	6.3	; 9 ; 8.1	10.3	56 6.7
DK	9	32 26.9	80 42.3	62	59 41.3	41 36.9	28 41.2	302 36.1
	Column Total	119 14.2	189 22.6	207 24.7	143 17.1	111 13.3	68 8.1	837 100.0

Chi-Square=36.83916 D.F.=25 Significance=.0598

RAISE PROPOR		FIELD SOC-BEHA!	FDIC !	HUMS-ART	MATH-SCI	BUS-PUB-!	LIBRARY	
GENFIELD-> C		•	;	S	1	ADM ;	1	R ow Total
PROPOR - LMER-HATB	1	37 31.4	89 47.8	73	37 27.2	37 33.3	45 67.2	318 38.7
LM-HDISCR	2	1 .8	4 2.2	3 1.5	2 1.5	2 1.8		12 1.5
LM HBOTH	3	5.1	19 10.2	18	8 5.9	2.7	5 7.5 +	59 7.2
HM-LATB	4	13	11 5.9	17 8.3	25 18.4	21 18.9 +	! !	87 10.6
HM-LDISCR	5	25	29 15.6	45 22.1	22 16.2	17 15.3	12	150 18.2
HM-LBOTH	6	19	16 8.6	11 5.4	11 8.1	10 1 9.0	2 3.0	69 8.4
SAME-8788	7	17	18 9.7	37 18.1	31 22.8	21 18.9	3 4.5	127 15.5
ERIC Chi-Square	Column Total =94.5 047	118 14.4 0 D.F.=3	186 22.6 O Signi	204 24.8 ficance=.	136 16,5 0000 J	111 13.5	67 8.2	822 100.0

TABLE 5 VARIATIONS BY RANK

DEPARTMENT HAS MERIT CRITERIA BY RANK Count | FULL | ASSOC | ASST | INSTR | A&P Row RANK-> Col Pct | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | Total HVCRIT 72 ! 17 255 260 73.1 | 76.2 | 53.3 | 51.5 | YES 6 | 49 | 34 | 11 ; 1 : 101 3.1 ! 3.0 | 30.0 | 11.5 NO 14.0 | 10.0 | 52 ¦ 15 ! 6 ! 165 45 ¦ 47 12.9 | 13.8 | 38.5 | 45.5 | 30.0 | 18.8 DK 20 878 349 341 135 3**3** Column 15.4 3.8 2.3 100.0 39.7 38.8 Total

Chi-square=76.71302 D.F.=8 Significance=.0000

DEPARTMENT CETS FAIR SHARE OF MERIT FUNDS BY RANK

	Count	FULL	ASSOC	ASST	INSTR	A&P	
RANK->	Col Pct	! ! 1	! ! 2	3	<u> </u>	6	Row Total
DPMERIT	 1	+ ! 21	+ ! 12	+ ! 5	+ !	+	+ 38
STRONGLY	-ACREE	6.1	3.5	3.7	!	! +	4,3
ACREE	2	; 56 ; 16.3	51 14.9	11	3.0	5 25.0	124
DISAGREE	3	55	72	17	18.2	10.0	152
STRONGLY	4 (-DISACRE	74	63	18 13.3	1 3.0	1 5.0	157
DK	9	138	144	84	25	12	403 46.1
	Column Total	344 39.4	342 39.1	135 15.4	33 3.8	20 2.3	874 100.0

Chi-Square=48.71092 D.F.=16 Significance=.0000



MERIT DISTRI				ACCT	INCTO I	49.D I	
	Count col Pct	FULL	ASSŒ ¦	ASST	INSTR	A&P	Row
D.I. CHIED	!	1 !	2	3	4	6	Total
DISMER -	1	83 24.6	74 21.7	26 19.5	2 6.1	5 25.0	190 22.0
7 <i>5</i> %	2 !	66 ¦	75 22.0	13 9.8	3	1 5.0	158 18.3
50%	3 !	34 10.1	36 10.6	8	3.0		79 9.1
2 <i>5</i> %	4	33 9.8	25 7.3	7	† 1	1 5.0	66 7.6
0%	5	31 9.2	18 5.3	1 7	6.1		58 6.7
DK	9 :	91 26.9	113	72 54.1	25 75.8	13 65.0	314
Chi-Square=	Column Total 73.61092	338 39.1 D.F.=2	341 39.4 0 Signif	133 15.4 icance=.0	33 3.8 0000	20 2.3	86 <i>5</i> 100.0
DATCE DOODO							
RAISE PROPO	rtions by						
	Count		¦ASSOC	ASST	INSTR	¦A&P	 Row
RANK->			ASSOC 2	ASST	INSTR	A&P	 Row Total
	Count Col Pct		1	1	İ	i	•
RANK-> (Count Col Pct	FULL 1 	2 +	3 35	 4 15	6 +	Total + 327
RANK-> (PROPOR LMER-HATB	Count Col Pct	FULL 1 137 40.3 11.2 11.2	2 + 129 38.7 +	35 27.8	1 4 1 5 1 50.0 1 6.7	6 + 1 11 1 55.0 +	Total
RANK-> (PROPOR LMER-HATB LM-HIDI SCR	Count Col Pct	FULL 1 137 40.3 140.3 15.3 18 15.3	2 	35 27.8 1 28	1 4 1 5 1 50.0 1 6.7	6 11 55.0 1 5.0	Total + 327 38.5 + 12 1.4 + 59
RANK-> OPROPOR LMER-HATB LM-HIDISCR LM HBOTH	Count Col Pct	FULL 1 137 40.3 140.3 15.3 18 15.3	2 129 38.7 4 1.2 26 7.8 35 10.5	35 27.8 1 28 1 1 1 8 1 29.5	1 15 50.0 2 6.7 4 6.7	6 11 55.0 1 5.0	Total + 327 - 38.5 + 12 - 1.4 + 59 - 6.9 + - 88
RANK-> PROPOR LMER-HATB LM-HIDISCR LM HBOTH HM-LATB	Count Col Pct	FULL 1 137 40.3 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11	2 	35 27.8 27.8 1 28 1 29.5 1 7.1	4 15 50.0 2 6.7 2 6.7	6 11 55.0 1 5.0 1 5.0	Total
RANK-> PROPOR LMER-HATB LM-HIDISCR LM HBOTH HM-LATB HM-LDISCR	Count Col Pct 1 2 3 4 5 6	FULL 1 137 40.3 140.3 15.3 162 17.6 17.6 17.6 128	2 129 38.7 1.2 1.2 7.8 7.8 35 10.5 17.7	35 27.8 27.8 1 .8 1 .8 1 .9.5 1 .9.5 1 .1 27 21.4	4 15 50.0 2 6.7 2 6.7	6 11 55.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 1 5.0	Total 327 38.5 12 1.4 59 6.9 188 10.4 153 18.0

TABLE 6
VARIATIONS BY UNION MEMBERSHIP

HAVE CRITERIA BY UNION MEMBERSHIP

	Count	MEMBER	NONMEMBE	,	
	Col Pct		R	Row	
		1	2	Total	
HVCRIT	1	+ ! 303	328	+ 631	Chi-square=6.06354
YES	-	72.7	66.0	69.0	D.F.=2 Significance=.0482
NO	2	47 11.3	58 11.7	105 11.5	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
DK	9	67	111 22.3	178 178 19.5	
•	Column Total	417 45.6	497 54.4	91 4 100.0	

DEPARTMENT CETS FAIR SHARE OF MERIT FUNDS BY UNION MEMBERSHIP

	Count	MEMBER	NONMEMBE		
	Col Pct	•	R	Row	
DPMERIT	~~~~~~~	1 +	¦ 2 ¦	Total	
DI WEST 1	1	14	25	39	Chi-square=11.95511
STRONGLY	-ACREE	3.4	5.1	4.3	D.F.=4 Significance=.0177
ACREE	2	46 11.1	80 16.2	126 13.9	Significance01//
DISACREI	3	+ 80 19.3	81 16.4	161 17.7	
STRONGL	4 Y-DISAGRE	+ 87 21.0	† 73 † 14.8	+ 160 17.6	
DK	9	188	235	423 46.5	
	Column	41 <i>5</i>	494 54.3	909 100.0	



MERIT DISTR				MEMBERSH	IIP		
1	Count ¦ Col Pct ¦		NONMEMBE !	Row			
·	: COI 1 C C	1 :	2	Total			
DISMER	+		+				
	1 ;	80 }	115 ¦	195		Chi-square=	7.83927
100%	t I	19.3	23.8	21.7		D.F.=5	
			+			Significanc	e=.1653
7 50.	2	75	83	158			
7 <i>5</i> %		18.1	17.1	17.6			
	3	44	37	81			
50%		10.6	7.6	9.0			
200	-	+	++	•			
	4	29	37	66			
2 <i>5</i> %		7.0	7.6	7.3			
	- ·	+	. 25	. 50			
0 %	5	34 ! 8.2	25 5.2	59 6.6			
Uzo		1 3.2	1	. 0.0			
	9	152	187	339			
DK		36.7	38.6	37.8			
		+	+	•			
	Column	414	484	898			
	Total	46.1	53.9	100.0			
RAISE PROPO	יים אוכים אוכי	V INITANI II	EMBEDCHID				
RAISE PROP							
		: MHMHHH					
		MEMBER 	NONMEMBE R				
	Col Pct	MEMBER 1	R R L 2	Row Total			
PROPOR	Col Pct	1 +	R 2 +	Row Total			
	Col Pct	1 + 1 196	R 2 + 142	Row Total + 338		Chi-square	=50.8 500 5
PROPOR LMER-HATI	Col Pct	1 +	R 2 +	Row Total		D.F.=6	
	Col Pct 1 3	1 1 196 1 47.9	R 2 142 30.0	Row Total + 338 38.3			
LMER-HATI	Col Pct 1 3	1 1 196 1 47.9	R 2 142 30.0 9	Row Total 338 38.3		D.F.=6	
	Col Pct 1 3	1 1 196 1 47.9	R 2 142 30.0	Row Total + 338 38.3		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI	Col Pct 1 3	1 1 196 1 47.9	R 2 142 30.0 9	Row Total 338 38.3		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI	Col Pct 1 3 2 3	1 196 1 47.9 1 1.0	R 2 142 30.0 9 1.9	Row Total 338 38.3 1 1.5		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI	Col Pct 1 3 2 3	1 196 1 47.9 1 1.0 1 29 1 7.1	R 2 142 30.0 9 1.9 36 7.6	Row Total 338 38.3 1 1.5 1 65 1 7.4		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI LM-HIDISCI LM HBOTH	Col Pct 1 3 2 3	1 196 47.9 1.0 29 7.1 19	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 13 1.5 + 65 7.4 + 89		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI	Col Pct 1 3 2 3	1 196 1 47.9 1 1.0 1 29 1 7.1	R 2 142 30.0 9 1.9 36 7.6	Row Total 338 38.3 1 1.5 1 65 1 7.4		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI LM-HIDISCI LM HBOTH	Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4	1 196 47.9 +	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 13 1.5 + 65 7.4 + 89 10.1 +		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI LM-HDISCI LM HBOTH HM-LATB	Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4	1 196 47.9 4 1.0 4	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 13 1.5 + 65 7.4 + 89 10.1 + 164		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI LM-HIDISCI LM HBOTH	Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4	1 196 47.9 +	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 13 1.5 + 65 7.4 + 89 10.1 +		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI LM-HDISCI LM HBOTH HM-LATB	Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4	1 196 47.9 4 1.0 4	R	Row Total 338 38.3 13 1.5 65 7.4 89 10.1 164 18.6 74		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI LM-HDISCI LM HBOTH HM-LATB	Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4 5 R 6	1 196 47.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 1.5 + 65 7.4 + 89 10.1 + 164 18.6 +		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATE LM-HDISCE LM HBOTH HM-LATB HM-LDISCE	Col Pct1 3 2 R 3 4	1 196 47.9 4.0 4.0 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 13 1.5 + 65 7.4 + 89 10.1 + 164 18.6 + 74 8.4 + 18.6		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI LM-HDISCI LM HBOTH HM-LATB HM-LDISCI HM-LBOTH	Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4 5 R 6	1 196 47.9 4 1.0 4	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 13 1.5 + 65 7.4 + 89 10.1 + 164 18.6 + 74 8.4 + 139		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATE LM-HDISCE LM HBOTH HM-LATB HM-LDISCE	Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4 5 R 6	1 196 47.9 4.0 4.0 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 13 1.5 + 65 7.4 + 89 10.1 + 164 18.6 + 74 8.4 + 18.6		D.F.=6	
LMER-HATI LM-HDISCI LM HBOTH HM-LATB HM-LDISCI HM-LBOTH	Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4 5 R 6	1 196 47.9 1.0 29 7.1 19 4.6 82 20.0 6.1 54 13.2	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 1.5 65 7.4 + 1.89 10.1 + 1.64 18.6 + 1.39 15.8 15		D.F.=6 Significand	ce=.0000
LMER-HATI LM-HDISCI LM HBOTH HM-LATB HM-LDISCI HM-LBOTH	Col Pct 1 3 2 3 4 5 R 6	1 196 47.9 1.0 29 7.1 19 4.6 82 20.0 6.1 54 13.2	R	Row Total + 338 38.3 + 1.5 + 65 7.4 + 89 10.1 + 164 18.6 + 74 8.4 + 139 15.8 + 15.8	46.4	D.F.=6 Significand	



TABLE 7 RAISE PROPORTIONS BY DEPARTMENT HAS CRITERIA

C	Count ol Pct 	YES 1	NO . 2	DK 9	Row Total
PROPOR -	1 ;	234	52	+ ¦ 59 ¦	+ 3 4 5
LMER-HATB	1 1	37.4	51.0	34.1	38.3
LM-HDISCR	2	8 1.3	2 2.0	1.7	13
LM HBOTH	3	41 6.5	! 8 ! 7.8	16 9.2	65 7.2
HM-LATB	4	66 10.5	1 7 1 6.9	21 12.1	94 10.4
HM-LDISCR	5	123 19.6	12	1 30 1 17.3	! 165 ! 18.3
HM-LBOTH	6	55 8.8 +	5 4.9	17 9.8	† 77 † 8.5
SAME-8788	7	99 15.8 +	16 15.7	1 27 1 15.6	142
	Column Total	626 69. <i>5</i>	102 11.3	173 19.2	901 100.0
Chi-Square	D.F.	Si	gnificance	2	
13.84448	12	<u></u>	.3107	-	

TABLE 8
RAISE PROPORTIONS BY DEPARTMENT CETS FAIR SHARE OF MERIT FUNDS

	Count Col Pct	STRONGLY -ACREE 1	AGREE 2	DISACREE 3	STRONGLY -DISAGRE 4		Row Total
PROPOR LMER-HATE	1	7 17.5	28 22.2	+ 73 44.8	80 49.4	1 <i>5</i> 7 38.4	345 38.3
LM-HDISCI	2	1 1 2.5	+ 	4 2.5	1.2	1.5	13
LM НВОТН	3	1 3 1 7.5	10 7.9	1 9 1 5.5	19 11.7	5.9	65 7.2
HM-LATB	4	13	21	12 7.4	10	38 9.3	94
HM-LDISC	<i>5</i> R	10.0	16	33	25	87	165
HM-LBOTH	6	10.0	17	12	9 5.6	35	77 1 8.6
SAME-878	7	8 20.0	34	20	17	62	141
	Column Total	40 4.4	126 14.0	163 18.1	162 18.0	409 45.4	900 100.0
Ch: Causan	• 55	C: ~	f:	_			



TABLE 9
RAISE PROPORTIONS BY RAISES DISTRIBUTED BY CRITERIA

	Count	100%	¦7 <i>5</i> %	¦ 50%	25%	0%	DK ;	
	Col Pct	! ! 1	2	} ! 3	4	5	9	Row Total
PROPOR LMER-HATE	1	41 20.9	43 27.6	¦ 41 ¦ 49.4	38 55.9	38 67.9	139 42.4	340 38.3
LM-HD1SCF	2	1.0	¦ 1 ¦ .6	3 3.6	1 1 1.5	1 1.8	5 1.5	13 1.5
им нвотн	3	7 3.6	9 5.8	8.4	8.8	3 5.4 +	30	62 7.0
HM-LATB	4	37 18.9	23	3 3 3 6	5 7.4	1 1 1.8	23	92
HM-LDISCI	5	34	39 25.0	19 22.9	8 11.8	10	; 56 ; 17.1	166
HM-LBOTH	6	29	9 5.8	3.6	6 8.8	1 1.8	28	76
SAME-878	7	46 23.5	32 20.5	8.4	5.9	3.6	47 14.3	138
	Column Total	196 22.1	1 <i>5</i> 6 17.6	83 9.4	68 7.7	56 6.3	328 37.0	887 100.0

Chi-Square D.F. Significance
125.88939 30 .0000

